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Abstract 
Numerical fiscal rules appear in the literature as a solution for the bias of pro-cyclicality and as 
an alternative to discretionary measures conducted by policy makers. With this work we will 
try to understand if fiscal rules do, in fact, impact budget balances and sovereign yields, and 
afterwards perform a simulation exercise to assess what would have been the debt level if a 
numerical expenditure rule had been applied in 1990. The empirical analysis is based in a data 
panel of 27 EU countries covering the years between 1990 and 2011. We find that fiscal rules 
contribute to the reduction of budget balances, specifically expenditure rules significantly 
impact primary expenditure and that countries with rules applied experienced smaller sovereign 
bond yields. The simulations show that the same rule applied to different countries produces 
very different results, particularly due to the initial level of primary expenditure.   
Keywords: numerical fiscal rules, expenditure rules, budget balance, sovereign yields. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the years, the concern with high budget deficits and pro-cyclical fiscal policies has grown. 
In the European Union (EU) several efforts have been undertaken to control this bias. In 1992 
was implemented the Maastricht Treaty that defined specific criteria to enter the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU): the debt-to-GDP ratio should not be over 60% and the budget deficit 
had a limit of 3% of GDP. In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was introduced to 
guarantee the fulfilment of the referred criteria, establishing sanctions for the countries that 
exceeded those limits. Later on, some reforms were made to the SGP, however, EU countries 
constantly ran budget balances and debt ratios above the accepted thresholds. 
Some additional measures were taken to strengthen the framework of the SGP and to ensure 
fiscal sustainability. The Fiscal Compact and the Six Pack were signed in 2012 with new rules 
at both the national and the supranational level. The rules to be adopted are a limit of annual 
structural deficits to a maximum of 0.5 percent GDP, and automatic mechanisms that are 
triggered when deviations from the rule occur. The supranational rules are directed to debt and 
non-discretionary expenditure. The debt ratio has to be reduced at an annually pace of no less 
that 1/20th of the distance between the observed level and the target, and the annual growth of 
the expenditure should not exceed a medium-term rate of growth. 
Numerical fiscal rules appear in the literature as a solution for this bias of pro-cyclicality and 
as an alternative to discretionary measures conducted by policy makers (Kopits & Symansky, 
1998). Such rules, by targeting fiscal aggregates as the budget balance and government debt or 
even subsets of these aggregates, like public expenditure or revenue, they contribute to 
macroeconomic stabilisation and sustainability of public finances. 
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Our analysis is based on two datasets of numerical fiscal rules elaborated by the European 
Commission and by the IMF, for the EU 27 Member States from 1990 to 2011. We assess the 
link between improvements of the budget balance and developments of the yield spreads and 
the use of fiscal rules. Moreover, we will focus only in rules that target public expenditure and 
we perform a simulation of the expenditure path and debt level associated with the application 
of a specific rule. 
The thesis is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of the existing related 
literature. Section 3 specifies the data and the variables used, and provides some stylised facts. 
Section 4 presents the methodology and the main results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2.  Related literature 
The existing literature has proven the impact of better fiscal policies on the output gap and on 
the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) (Gali & Perotti, 2003; Turrini, 2008), more 
specifically some authors have tried to explain the contribution of numerical fiscal rules to 
improve the fiscal stance (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008). Additionally, more attention 
has been given to the expenditure side of the balance, as Ayuso (2012) explains, because it is 
the one variable that can be more directly controlled by the government. Generally, the results 
indicate that fiscal rules do improve public finances and that numerical expenditure rules can 
enhance budgetary discipline (Hauptmeier et al., 2010; Holm-Hadulla et al., 2010; Wierts, 
2008). 
The most common definition of such rules is the one suggested by Kopits and Symansky (1998) 
that fiscal rules are a permanent numerical constraint on fiscal policy applied to an indicator of 
fiscal performance or to subsets of these overall aggregates. The authors make also assumptions 
concerning why the rules are applied and in what conditions. The motivation for 
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implementation that are often indicated are macroeconomic stability, support to other macro 
policies, sustainability of public finances and adverse market reactions and spillover effects. 
Some aspects have been considered when introducing a fiscal rule: the statutory basis, the 
enforcement, the monitoring of compliance and long-term commitment. Several institutional 
arrangements can easily work: constitutional, legal or treaty provision, regulation or policy 
guidelines. For the enforcement and the monitoring, the authors recommend that they should 
be carried out by an independent authority. Finally, Kopits and Symansky (1998) stress that 
fiscal rules can have great credibility gains if the government commits itself to the rule with 
transparency. 
In Kumar et al. (2009), fiscal rules are defined as an institutional mechanism design to support 
fiscal credibility and discipline, to contain the size of the government and to guarantee 
intergenerational equity. For Budina et al. (2012), fiscal rules are used when there are distorted 
incentives and pressures to overspend, contributing to debt sustainability and fiscal 
responsibility. Schuknecht (2004) mentions a different way via which rules have an impact: 
specially for the time inconsistency problems1, rules anchor expectations about the 
sustainability of fiscal policy in the future as they limit the behaviour of the government. 
Further clarification is needed concerning the types of fiscal rules, and the type of fiscal rules 
depends on the fiscal aggregate targeted. Budina et al. (2012) have a simple definition, as 
described below: 
- Debt rules that target the public debt as percentage of GDP are the most effective in 
terms of convergence to the defined objective. However, there are a few setbacks, debt 
                                                     
1 The author refers to the solution of time inconsistency problems when exposing the problem of correcting fiscal 
situations with discretion. Policy makers after making a commitment have economic or political incentives to 
brake it. Fiscal rules appear as an alternative where there is no time inconsistency problems.  
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levels are not easily influenced by budgetary measures in the short-term, offering no 
practical guidance for policy makers. Moreover, when the target is binding, fiscal policy 
can become pro-cyclical when the economy is hit by a shock.  
- Budget balance rules affect the variable that influences debt ratios, which is under the 
control of policy makers, allowing for the operational guidance that debt rules do not 
have. These rules can account for cyclicality, allowing for economic stabilisation and 
addressing the consequences of economic shocks. 
- Expenditure rules can limit total, primary or current spending. They do not have direct 
impact on debt sustainability, because they do not limit the revenue side. They are, 
however, appropriately used as a tool of consolidation and sustainability when matched 
with debt or budget balance rules. Expenditure rules are not consistent with 
discretionary fiscal stimulus, the amount of resources spent by the government are 
directly established by these rules. 
- Revenue rules set the upper and lower limit on revenue and are intended to prevent 
excessive tax burdens and improve revenue collection. As for the expenditure rules, 
revenue rules also have no effect on the control of public debt. The revenue side is very 
cyclical so it might be difficult to impose limits to their development. As expenditure 
rules they have greater impact when the objective is to change the government size. 
The implementation of fiscal rules cannot be done without compromising other aspects. Ayuso 
et al. (2007) refer to the tension between fiscal discipline and the achievements of fiscal policy 
over the cycle, due to the pressure of recurring to contractionary fiscal policy in periods of slow 
growth. The authors defend that the existence of clear escape-clauses contributes to the 
minimisation of the tension. They also identify second trade-off effects between low deficits 
and the desirable level of specific types of government spending. The creation of protection 
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categories of expenditure, not covered by the rules is presented as a solution. Finally, the 
attainment of low deficits can be due to “creative accounting” practices and one-off procedures, 
which can be attenuated by designing proper rules and setting adequate institutions for fiscal 
monitoring and control. 
Empirically, we can find a plethora of results that justify and support the use of fiscal rules. 
First, Turrini (2008) sates that fiscal policy has been increasingly recognised as effective on 
output (when properly designed) and that it could be the only tool left to offset demand shocks 
with a supranational monetary policy. Gali & Perotti (2003) found that, after the Maastricht 
Treaty, fiscal policy became a-cyclical, which Turrini (2008) also concludes, essentially at the 
margin. This is a concept that needs further explanation: fiscal policy being a-cyclical at the 
margin means that the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) is not influenced by changes 
in the output gap. Therefore, this cannot be used to conclude if fiscal policy contributes or not 
to improvements in the output gap. However, the results evaluated across the cycle can be 
different: by analysing fiscal policy on average, it is possible to conclude about the impact in 
reducing or expanding existing imbalances. Turrini (2008) reports that the CAPB falls when 
the output is above potential and rises when it is below. 
Furthermore, the effective impact of fiscal rules on the budget balance was already tested in the 
existing literature, and the results show a robust link between numerical fiscal rules and fiscal 
performance. Therefore, stronger rules lead to a higher CAPB, and this effect becomes weaker 
when the dependent variable is the debt. This link is also robust with respect to the criteria used 
to construct the fiscal rules indexes (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008).  Afonso & 
Hauptmeier (2009) also observe that fiscal rules have an impact on primary balance, and also 
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conclude that if the debt ratio is below 80%, a strong fiscal rule contributes to the improvement 
of the primary surplus.   
The European Commission (2008) reached similar results and concluded that the CAPB 
improved after the introduction of fiscal rules while being stable, on average, over the period 
in analysis; whereas cyclically adjusted primary expenditure declined significantly in the period 
after an expenditure rule was implemented in comparison with the average change over the 
period. Finally, Pina and Venes (2011) in an exercise to assess the determinants of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure fiscal forecasts report that a higher coverage and strength of expenditure rules 
are associated with more prudent forecasts. 
Some authors tried to go further by assessing the different impact of fiscal revenues and 
expenditures. The results show that revenues are essentially a-cyclical and expenditure 
significantly pro-cyclical, explaining the behaviour of fiscal policy (Gali & Perotti, 2003; 
Wierts, 2008). 
Ayuso (2012) in a paper entirely dedicated to the survey of expenditure rules’ characteristics 
and forms of implementation, explains why these type of rules are more beneficial to use. The 
argument is that they can provide a better balance between macroeconomic stabilisation and 
budgetary discipline. The reasoning is straightforward, expenditure is the part of the budget that 
the government can easily control and is also more likely to induce deficit bias. The formulation 
and monitoring of the rule is simpler, leading to more transparency and they do not prevent 
automatic stabilisers from operating. 
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To that extent, it is justifiable to focus on expenditure policies and in the solution for their pro-
cyclicality. Wierts (2008) states that expenditure rules can be a solution, and his results suggest 
that the stronger expenditure rules, the weaker the effects of revenue shocks.  
Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010) reach similar results and additionally find that the effectiveness of 
expenditure rules depend on the type of government expenditure taken into account: more 
flexible spending leads to more pro-cyclical biases, while fixed expenditure – interest 
expenditure – are less subject to changes by policymakers and have no cyclical patterns. Table 
I summarises some of the available studies dealing with fiscal rules.  
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3.  Data and Variables 
3.1. Data 
Our database covers 27 EU countries between 1990 and 2011: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, 
France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and United Kingdom. 
All fiscal and macroeconomic variables, CAPB, Debt-to-GDP ratio (debt), Primary 
expenditure (pe), Output gap measured as the gap between actual and potential gross 
domestic product (outputgap), 10-year sovereign bond yield (yield), short-term interest 
rate (I), current account balance (CAB), consumer price index (CPI), real effective 
exchange rate (REER), industrial production (IP) and finally, GDP growth rate (GDPgr) 
were extracted from the AMECO dataset. The measurement of international risk aversion 
is taken from the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX), from 
Yahoo! Finance. 
To access the impact of particular events on the dependent variable in consideration we 
include in the regressions a set of dummy variables that are defined as follows: 
 EMU: is a dummy for the run-up to the EMU, that takes the value 1 for the EU-
15 countries and years between years 1994 and 1998 (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun 
et al., 2008). 
 SGP: represents the introduction of the SGP and takes the value 1 for euro-area 
countries and years after year 1998 (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008). 
 Enlargement: is set to 1 for the 10 countries entering EU in 2003 and after (Ayuso 
et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008). 
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 Election year: takes the value 1 if parliamentary elections took place (Klaus 
Armingeon, 2012). 
 Change in Government Ideology: takes the value 1 if it took place a change in the 
ideological composition of the cabinet (Klaus Armingeon, 2012). 
The EC’s fiscal rule index (FRI) is constructed based on information collected directly 
from the Members States. The dataset covers all types of numerical fiscal rules: budget 
balance, debt, expenditure, and revenue rules; and all level of government: central, 
regional and local, general government and social security. The survey reports 
information that is divided into 5 criteria: the statutory base of the rule, the room for 
revising objectives, the mechanisms of monitoring compliance and enforcement of the 
rule, the existence of predefined enforcement mechanisms, and media visibility of the 
rule. This index covers the period 1990-2011. 
The IMF’s fiscal rule index has a much wider coverage, comprising information on 
numerical fiscal rules for 81 countries with a time frame that goes from 1985 to the end 
of 2012. The type of rules concerned and their characteristics are broadly similar to the 
ones of the EC’s index.  For the purpose of comparability, we consider this index only 
for the countries and the years available for the EC’s index.  
The statistical information as the number of observations, average and standard deviation 
of all variables used in the empirical analysis can be found in Appendix B.  
3.2. Stylised Facts 
Based on EC’s FRI, the number of numerical fiscal rules in place since 1990 has 
continuously grown from 13 rules to a total of 77 in 2011 (Figure A-I in Appendix A). 
The rules targeting the budget balance represent the majority of the rules in place from 
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1990 to 2011, with debt rules and the expenditure rules in the recent years increasing 
considerably. Rules targeting government revenue are the ones with less representation 
(Figure A-II).  
Concerning the type of government that is covered, most of the rules were applied to the 
Local Government throughout the years, with a growing representation of rules applied 
to the General Government, in recent years (Figure A-III in Appendix A). 
Central Government applied mostly expenditure rules, whereas General Government and 
Local Government targeted the budget balance (Table II). 
Table II 
Total numerical fiscal rules by type of government and aggregate targeted 
  GG LG RG CG SS Multiple Total 
BBR 15 18 6 5 5 6 55 
DR 7 11 2 3 1 3 27 
ER 5 0 1 14 3 8 31 
RR 2 0 0 3 1 3 9 
ER/BBR 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Total 29 29 9 25 10 22 124 
Note: BBR – Balance Budget Rule; DR – Debt Rule; ER – Expenditure Rule; RR 
– Revenue Rule; GG – General Government; LG – Local Government ; RG – 
Regional Government; SS – Social Security. 
Source: Numerical Fiscal Rule Database, European Commission. 
Currently, almost all EU countries have fiscal rules in place. Italy is the country with 
more rules, ten, in the range of years considered (see Figure A-IV in Appendix A), 
whereas the ones with less rules are Latvia, the Netherlands and Romania (Figure A-IV). 
Cyprus, Greece and Malta never adopted a numerical fiscal rule. In 2011, the country 
with more rules applied, six, was France (Figure A-V in Appendix A) and almost 30% of 
the countries had only 2 rules in place.  
Analysing now the evolution of the FRI per country, we can see countries with no 
variation in the way they implemented numerical fiscal rules, starting by the countries 
already mentioned that have no rules in force (Cyprus, Greece and Malta), countries like 
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Netherlands, Latvia, Romania, Germany that have changed their rules a few times, and 
countries that are more dynamic with more frequent changes in the rules (Appendix A, 
Figure A-VI to A-IX). 
4.  Empirical Strategy and Results 
4.1. Empirical specifications 
For the empirical analysis, we use a fiscal reaction function to assess the impact of the 
existence of fiscal rules on the primary balance (Debrun et al., 2008). Therefore, we have 
estimated a fiscal reaction function following the common approach in the literature (see 
Table I for a review of the literature on the subject):  
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑖 +  𝛿𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜆𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜙𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡. (1) 
Where capbit is the cyclically adjusted primary balance in country i at time t, βi represents 
the individual effects of each country i, debtit-1 is the debt-to-GDP ratio of country i in 
period t-1, outputgapit-1 is the lagged output gap, friit is the fiscal rule index and finally xit 
represents a set of variables that can have additional explanatory power, focusing on 
specific events (e.g. election years and run-up to EMU). 
After computing the results we expect ϕ > 0 meaning that more and better rules (better 
FRI) impacts positively in the value of the CAPB leading to a healthier fiscal position. 
As mentioned above, we will do this exercise using the FRI from the EC and compare 
these results with the ones using the IMF’s FRI. In addition, and to assess the 
effectiveness of expenditure rules we will compute an expenditure rule index based on 
the EC Fiscal Rule Dataset and use primary expenditure as dependent variable. 
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To have an additional assessment of the importance of numerical fiscal rules for long-
term government bond yields, we also estimate a specification to analyse the impact of 
FRI on the 10-year maturity bond yields: 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑖𝑡 +  𝜌?̅?𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, (2) 
where, 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the 10-year maturity bond yield, ?̅?𝑖𝑡 is a vector comprising CAPB, debt, 
CAB, REER, IP, GDPgr and CIP, for period t  and country i. vixit is the measure of 
investors’ willingness to take risk, Iit is the short-term interest rate for each period t and 
county i and fri has the definition already mentioned above. 
4.2. Baseline Results 
Our baseline results for the EC index overall suggest that the FRI is significant with a 
positive coefficient, this means that if the FRI increases by 1 unit, the CAPB can increase 
up to 0.52 percentage points (p.p.). In column 1, Table III, the control variables were 
omitted to see if they can bias the impact of the rules, and the effect is still robust. 
Table III 
Baseline results: fiscal rules and fiscal performance 
  EC IMF 

















c -098 ** -0.70 ** -0.60  -0.16 -1.37 ** -0.88  -0.73  0.01  
 (0.42)  (0.30)  (0.47)  (0.54)  (0.56)  (0.52)  (0.65)  (0.95)  
capb(-1) 0.63 *** 0.83 *** 0.68 *** 0.71 *** 0.61 *** 0.87 *** 0.75 *** 0.80 *** 
 (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.17)  
debt(-1) 0.02 ** 0.01 ** 0.01  0.01  0.01 ** 0.00  0.01  0.00  
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
outputgap(-1) -0.03  -0.02  -0.06  -0.06 -0.06  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
fri 0.51 *** 0.25 *** 0.52 *** 0.31 0.29 * 0.18  0.07  -0.15  
 (0.16)  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.24)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.26)  
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  EC IMF 

















emu -  1.19 *** 2.05 *** 2.34 ** -  0.89 ** 3.89 *** 3.76 *** 
   (0.31)  (0.76)  (1.06)    (0.38)  (0.80 )  (0.83)  
enlargement -  0.20  1.23 ** -1.30 *** -  0.25  0.49  1.05  
   (0.28)  (0.48)  (0.44)    (0.34)  (0.63)  (0.70)  
sgp -  -0.06  -0.87 * 1.30 ** -  -0.13  -1.00 ** -1.01 ** 
   (0.20)  (0.44)  (0.54)    (0.21)  (0.48)  (0.57)  
legelec -  -0.77 *** -0.72 *** -0.64 *** -  -0.70 *** -0.72 *** -0.73 *** 
   (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.18)    (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.20)  
gov_new -  0.43 ** 0.50 ** 0.59 ** -  0.52 ** 0.66 *** 0.75 *** 
   (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.25)    (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.27)  
mdms -  0.00  0.00  0.00 ** -  0.00  0.00 * 0.00 ** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Number of observations 463  437  437  397  420  366  366  324  
R2 0.72  0.69  0.76  0.77  0.73  0.67  0.78  0.78 
Adjusted R2 0.69  0.68  0.73  0.73  0.70  0.66  0.74  0.74  
Endogeneity test -  -  -  0.21  -  -  -  0.74  
Fixed Effects 1.97 *** -  2.16 *** -  2.55 *** -  2.05 *** -  
Random effects 
(Hausman test)                  
Period -  20.66 ** -  -     15.94  -  -  
Cross-section -   13.40  -   -       9.82  -   -   
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Period range for EC’s FRI: 1991-2011 (463 observations), 1991-2010 (437 
observations and 397 observations). Period range for IMF’s FRI: 1990-2011 (420 observations), 1991-2010 
(366 observations and 324 observations). Instrumental variables are the FRI own lag and a variable 
capturing the commitment of governments.   
 
When the control variables are included in column (2), Table III, the run-up to the EMU, 
the election period and the ideological change in government composition have a 
significant impact on de dependent variable. The interpretation is as follows: in the years 
of implementation of the EMU in the EU-15 countries, the CAPB is 1.19 p.p. higher. The 
years where occurred an ideological change led to an increment of the CAPB of 0.43 p.p. 
and finally the years of election have a negative impact of 0.77. 
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The results obtained from a fixed effects OLS regression, column (3), Table III, are 
essentially the same, with two more variables becoming statistically significant, the EU-
10 countries after 2003 have an increment of 1.23 p.p on CAPB and those being part of 
the euro-area after 1998 have a negative impact of CAPB of -0.87. 
Column 4, Table III, reports a Two Stage Least Squares with the instrument of FRI being 
its own lag and a variable capturing the commitment of governments2, FRI is no longer 
significant and the p-value of the Wu-Hausman test shows that there are no problems of 
endogeneity. However, there are concerns about reverse causality between the fiscal 
stance and FRI, still, by analysing the Granger Causality Test (Appendix CTable C-III) 
we cannot conclude if, in fact, is the implementation of  fiscal rules that leads to better 
balances, or if it is the better fiscal outcomes that lead to the implementation of more 
rules.   
The use of the IMF’s Fiscal Rule Index generates some different results, and for the same 
period range we have only 366 observations. The index is significant only at a level of 
10% with no control variables included. Although the index takes into account the same 
characteristics and types of rules, the methodology used is different and so the results 
might differ because of that (see column (5)-(8), Table III). Therefore, the methodology 
used to compute the index may have an important role in the conclusions that can be made 
about the impact of fiscal rules in fiscal outcomes. 
We performed the same exercise for the IMF Expenditure Rule Index (ERI), calculated 
based on the methodology provided in the EC’s FRI Database applied only to rules 
                                                     
2 Similarly to Debrun et al. (2008), we use a dummy variable representing governments that by their nature 
– coalition governments – have implemented commitment models, which easily allow the implementation 
of fiscal rules. This variable was constructed based on (Hallerberg et al., 2009) and (Annett, 2006). 
Regarding the effectiveness of this instruments see Debrun et al. (2008), box. 3, p. 325. 
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targeting public expenditure. We considered as dependent variable the Primary 
Expenditure - interest payments are hardly controlled by the governments - as expenditure 
rules are more effective regarding expenditure alone and not the whole balance (see Table 
IV). 
We performed again a fixed effects OLS regression and an IV estimation with the 
instrument being the ERI’s own lag. Column (1), Table IV, similarly to the analysis for 
the FRI, accounts for the possibility of control variables biased the significance of the 
ERI on Primary Expenditure. Despite this omission, numerical expenditure rules 
contribute to the control of public expenditure at a significant level. This conclusion is 
valid when the control variables are included, column (2), but with a smaller coefficient. 
In this way, holding everything constant, the increase of one unit in the ERI contributes 
to a decrease of the Primary Expenditures-to-GDP ratio of 0.18 p.p. in (2) and 0.37 p.p. 
in (3). The introduction of the SGP, election periods, and changes in government ideology 
are other explanatory variables with an impact in Public Expenditure. The results remain 
robust when the ERI instruments are used, confirming that the results are not biased due 
to reverse causality. 
Table IV 
The impact of expenditure rules on primary expenditure 









c 12.99 *** 1.33 *** 9.41 *** 40.7 *** 
 (3.42)  (0.46)  (2.71)  (1.00)  
pe(-1) 0.70 *** 0.98 *** 0.78 *** -0.66 *** 
 (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.13)  
debt(-1) -0.01  -0.01 ** -0.01  0.00  
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
outputgap(-1) 0.05  0.05  0.04  0.09  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  
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eri -0.33 ** -0.18 ** -0.37 ** -0.88 *** 
 (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.23)  
emu -  -0.44 * -1.47  -2.64  
   (0.25)  (1.02)  (1.65)  
enlargement -  -0.39 * -0.16  -0.58  
   (0.24)  (0.46)  (0.70)  
sgp -  0.23  0.96 ** 2.59 *** 
   (0.18)  (0.47)  (0.67)  
legelec -  0.63 *** 0.59 *** 0.62 ** 
   (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.25)  
gov_new -  -0.41 ** -0.57 *** -0.77 *** 
   (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.29)  
mdms -  0.00  0.00  0.00  
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Number of observations 464  437  437  397  
R2 0.98  0.97  0.98  0.97  
Adjusted R2 0.97  0.97  0.97  0.96  
Endogeneity test -  -  -  0.11  
Fixed Effects 2.56 ***  1.54 **  
Random effects (Hausman test)         
Period -  17.88 * -  -  
Cross-section -   33.09 *** -  -  
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Period range: 1991-2011 (464 observations), 1991-2010 (437 observations and 
397 observations). Instrumental variables are the ERI own lag and a variable capturing the commitment of 
governments.   
 
To stress the importance of numerical fiscal rules, we performed an additional empirical 
exercise to assess the impact of rules on the 10-year maturity bonds yield. The index 
shows significance in every regression computed, meaning that if the FRI increases by 
one unit, the yield, in (1) of Table V, decreases by 0.25 p.p. When investors become more 
risk averse - vix increases - we can see that, holding everything else constant, the yields 
decrease by 0.02 p.p.. As expected, the variables representing better economic 
environment – GDPgr and IP – lead to lower values of sovereign bond yields. In column 
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(3) of Table V, we performed a 2SLS, the endogeneity testes shows that the FRI is not 
endogenous, regarding causality, the Granger tests in Appendix C, show that causality 
runs from the FRI to the yields. 
 In Appendix C, Table C-I and Table-CII, it is possible to observe regression results 
considering different sets of explanatory variables and, also, the same regressions but 
considering the yield spread against Germany as the dependent variable. The conclusions 
are the same, the FRI is significant in all regressions and the variables capturing economic 
developments maintain their statistical significant as well.  
Table V 
The impact of FRI on 10-Year Bond Yield 







c 6.44 *** 7.57 *** 6.25 *** 
 (1.02)  (0.92)  (0.82)  
capb(-1) -0.13 *** -0.15 *** -0.14 *** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
debt 0.00  0.01 * 0.00  
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
cpi 0.01  -0.02 * 0.01  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
cab 0.02  0.08 *** 0.03  
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
reer 0.00  -  -  
 (0.01)     
i 0.53 *** 0.47 *** 0.51 *** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
ip -0.04 *** -0.02 *** -0.03 *** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
fri -0.25 *** -0.30 *** -0.34 *** 
 (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.10)  
vix -0.02  -0.02 * -0.02 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
gdpgr -0.10 ** -0.13 *** -0.10 ** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
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Number of observations 337  362  335  
R2 0.63  0.75  0.68  
Adjusted R2 0.62  0.72  0.68  
Endogeneity test -  -  0.36  
Cross-section fixed effects -  3.33 *** -  
Random effects 
(Hausman test)       
Cross-section 56.78 *** -   -   
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and 
*** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Period 
range: 1995-2011 (337 observations), 1991-2010 (362 observations 
and 335 observations). Instrumental variables are the FRI own lag and 
a variable capturing the commitment of governments. 
 
Overall, we observe that the FRI is strongly significant is most of the regressions, together 
with the variables capturing developments in the EU and in the EMU (sgp, emu, and 
enlargement). The variables capturing countries specific developments – election and 
gov-new – have also explanatory power for the budget balances. When we consider only 
expenditure rules, these are also important to explain primary expenditure ratios. 
Countries with rules applied to discretionary public expenditure experience better 
expenditure ratios. In addition, capital markets react positively to countries that have rules 
implemented, demanding lower yields.  
4.3. Simulation 
Finally, we performed a simulation of the level of government debt, by computing an expenditure 
rule and applying it to the real expenditure level based on the specifications in Hauptmeier et al. 
(2010). For the detailed methodology please see Appendix D. 
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The simulation exercise has the purpose of understanding what would have been the debt 
developments if EU countries had adopted a rule for the discretionary component of public 
expenditures. 
First, we have a few countries with an unusual situation in the period considered, with 
years where public expenditures were greater than the consolidated gross debt. For that 
reason, rule-based expenditure levels would lead to negative values of debt. 
Second, in the majority of the countries only when GDP was computed considered an 
expenditure multiplier of 0.3 the debt ratio was lower than the actual ratio, considering 
the last five year of the analysis. In 2013, only three countries do not present rule-based 
values of the debt ratio above the actual one: Italy, Greece and Sweden. Sweden is the 
only case, in the EU-15 countries that would not benefit of a ruled-based expenditure 
path, with new debt developments very similarly to the actual path.  
Considering the SGP constraint of maintaining the debt ratio below 60%, this barrier 
would have been exceed much later, for Denmark this means that it would never 
experience debt ratios above 60%. For Austria, instead of being over 60% in 1993 it 
would only reach this value in 2009, as well as France and Portugal, instead of 2003 and 
2004, respectively. Greece would not enter the EMU and adopted the SGP with debt ratios 
already above 60% but would pass it only in 1996, the barrier of 100% debt would only 
be achieved in 2009 instead of 1996. 
Overall, the fiscal stance of the majority of EU countries would have been much sounder 
if a rule applied to public expenditures had been in place since 1990. 
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Figure 1: Actual and rule-based debt in percentage of GDP for EU-15 countries 





5.  Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis was to assess whether countries with more or better fiscal rules 
implemented have better budget balances, and consequently better debt ratios. From the 
theory discussed, the general idea is that there is a relation between fiscal rules and fiscal 
balances. From our empirical study we confirm that countries with more fiscal rules, in 
fact, have better CAPB. But we could not guarantee that causality runs from FRI to 
CAPB. Also, the methodology used to compute this type of indexes seems to matter, 
given that IMF’s FRI for the same countries, considering broadly the same criteria, 
produces different results from the ones computed with the EC’s FRI.  
Considering the capital markets perspective, we studied the impact of the FRI on the 10-
year bond yield. Investors seem to reward countries that have implemented fiscal rules, 
and this can be explained by the commitment associated with such rules and with more 
certainty about the fiscal results. 
With revenues being essential a-cyclical, we tried to prove that rules applied to public 
expenditures contribute to their control and for the consolidation of fiscal balances, our 
regression results show that the ERI has explanatory power to explain developments in 
primary expenditures. Therefore, it is justifiable to construct rules that target specifically 
the expenditure side of budget. 
This leads to the second objective of our work, assess the debt developments of the EU 
countries if they had implemented an expenditure rule in 1990. If public expenditures had 
increased at the growth rate of potential GDP, countries would have experienced smaller 
debt ratios compared to the actual ones and would have had more easily complied with 
the SGP constraint of debt ratios below 60%. 
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As mentioned before, this work has some limitations. First, it was not possible to prove 
that, without doubt, the FRI causes better results of the CAPB and not the other way 
around. Second, different methods of computing the fiscal rule index can lead to different 
results. Further analysis on the proper methodology to be used or new instruments 
capturing the commitment to rules could contribute to the conclusions on the subject. 
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Figure A-II: Numerical fiscal rules by type of aggregate targeted since 1990 
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Figure A-IV: Total numerical fiscal rules by country 
Figure A-III: Numerical fiscal rules by type of government since 1990 
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Figure A-V: Numerical fiscal rules by country in 2011 
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Figure A-VI: FRI by country from 1990 to 2011 
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Figure A-VII: FRI by country from 1990 to 2011 (continued) 
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Figure A-VIII: FRI by country from 1990 to 2011 (continued) 
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Figure A-IX: FRI by country from 1990 to 2011 (continued) 
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Appendix B – Data statistics 
Table B-I 
Descriptive statistics 




CAPB 0.30 0.39 3.06 -1.09 10.67 647 
Debt-to-GDP DEBT 60.43 49.97 44.59 2.46 12.34 678 
Primary 
Expenditure 
PE 41.50 42.66 10.58 -2.54 11.65 657 
Output Gap OUTPUTGAP -0.12 -0.03 2.93 -0.06 6.21 669 
CE's FRI FRI 0.00 -0.21 1.00 0.59 2.13 593 
IMF's FRI FRI_IMF 2.40 2.44 0.86 0.44 1.85 443 
Expenditure Rule 
Index 
ERI 0.00 -0.50 1.00 2.31 8.91 594 
Run-up of the 
EMU Dummy 
EMU 0.11 0.00 0.31 2.47 7.13 675 
Entrance of 10 
countries in EU 
Dummy 
ENLARGEMENT 0.18 0.00 0.38 1.69 3.84 675 
Introduction of 
SGP Dummy 
SGP 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.50 1.25 675 
Election Year 
Dummy 




GOV_NEW 0.27 0.00 0.44 1.03 2.06 539 
District Magnitude MDMS -425.45 -999.00 738.15 0.78 2.03 618 
10 Year Bond 
Yield 





VIX 20.45 21.98 5.89 0.30 2.15 713 
Shor-term interest 
rate 
I 6.51 4.39 8.12 5.10 39.12 524 
Current Account 
Balance 
CA -2.90 -2.77 3.24 -1.13 9.51 632 
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
REER 99.22 99.48 14.24 0.39 5.38 540 
GDP growth rate GDPGR 2.23 2.40 3.71 -1.71 17.72 663 
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Appendix C – Additional Results 
Table C-I 
Estimation results considering the impact of FRI on 10 Year Bond Yield 







c 5.89 *** 5.77 *** 5.66 *** 
 (1.04 ) (1.20 ) (1.07) 
capb(-1) -0.04 -  -0.03 
 (0.03 )  (0.04) 
debt 0.00 -  0.00) 
 (0.00 )  (0.00) 
cpi 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.03 ** 
 (0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
cab 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.02 ) (0.02 ) (0.03) 
reer 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
i 0.54 *** 0.53 *** 0.53 *** 
 (0.04 ) (0.04 ) (0.04) 
ip -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 
 (0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
fri -0.30 *** -0.32 *** -0.42 *** 
 (0.07 ) (0.07 ) (0.10) 
vix -0.03 *** -0.03 ** -0.04 *** 
 (0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
gdpgr -0.12 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 *** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Number of observations 338 338  311 
R2 0.60 0.59  0.60 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.58  0.59 
Endogeneity test -  -  0.01  
Random effects 
(Hausman test) -  -  -  
Cross-section 56.77 *** 53.56 *** -  
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and 
*** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. 
Period range: 1995-2011 (338 observations and 331 observations). 
Instrumental variables are the FRI own lag and a variable capturing 
the commitment of governments. 
  





Estimation results considering the impact of FRI on 10-Year Yield Spreads against 
Germany 
Dependent Variable 10-year yield spread against Germany 











(6)        
c -2.46 ** -2.68 ** -2.74 *** c -1.92 ** -0.65  -3.68 *** 
 (0.98)  (1.16)  (1.03)  (0.96)  (0.73)  (0.78)  
capb -0.06 * -  -0.05  capb(-1) -0.15 *** -0.14 *** -0.16 *** 
 (0.03)    (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
debt 0.00  -  0.00  debt 0.00  0.02 *** 0.00  
 (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
cpi 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** cpi 0.07 *** 0.02 ** 0.06 *** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
cab 0.00  -0.01  0.00  cab 0.02  0.10 *** 0.03  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
reer -0.02 *** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** reer -0.02 ** -  -  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)     
i 0.42 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** i 0.41 *** 0.27 *** 0.34 *** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  
ip -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** ip -0.03 *** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
fri -0.28 *** -0.32 *** -0.37 *** fri -0.23 *** 0.09  -0.19 ** 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.10)  
vix -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** vix -0.02 * -0.02  -0.01  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
gdpgr -0.12 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 ** gdpgr -0.10 ** -0.12 *** -0.08 * 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Number of observations 338  338  311  337  362  335  
R2 0.57  0.56  0.57  0.62  0.73  0.54  
Adjusted R2 0.56  0.55  0.56  0.61  0.70  0.53  
Endogeneity test -  -  0.08  -  -  0.99  
Cross-section fixed effects -  -  -   -  8.60 *** -  
Random effects 
(Hausman test) -  -  -   -  -  -  
Cross-section 145.06 *** 98.83 ***       122.62 ***         
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Period range: 1995-2011 (338, 337 and 331observartions), 1991-2010 (362 and 
335 observations). Instrumental variables are the FRI own lag and a variable capturing the commitment of 
governments. 
  





Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 CAPB does not Granger Cause FRI 436 0.28068 0.7554 
 FRI does not Granger Cause CAPB  1.95933 0.1422 
 YIELD does not Granger Cause FRI 388 0.53108 0.5884 
 FRI does not Granger Cause YIELD  3.90872 0.0209 
 PE does not Granger Cause ERI 437 4.61091 0.0104 
 ERI does not Granger Cause PE  1.01303 0.3640 
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Appendix D – Simulation Methodology and Figures 
The methodology of the simulation exercise is based on Hauptmeier et al. (2010). The 
first step is to construct a new expenditure path that follows a predetermined rule of 
growth. For the purpose of this exercise we define the rule growth rate as the same growth 





𝐺𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑔𝑟𝑡),  𝐺𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 = 0 
𝐺𝑡 is the rule-based expenditure path.  
𝐺𝑡 is the actual expenditure path. 
𝑔𝑟𝑡 is the growth rule 
Debt path 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 + ∆𝐺𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡, where 
∆𝐺𝑡 is the difference between the rule-based expenditure path and the actual 
expenditure path. 
Interest rate 
𝐼𝑡 = ∆𝐺𝑡 ∗ 𝑟, 
r is the implicit interest rate computed as Interests over Gross Consolidated 
Debt at period t. 
GDP 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 ∗ (1 + %∆𝐺𝑡 ∗ 𝑚), 
%∆𝐺𝑡 is the difference between the rule-based expenditure path and the actual 
expenditure path in percentage of GDP, m  is the expenditure multiplier – we 
consider four possible values 0.3, 0.75, 1, 1.53. 
We used total expenditure excluding interest, consolidated gross debt, gdp at market prices all expressed in billions 
of national currency for each country extracted from AMECO Database. 
 
  
                                                     
3 GDP was computed considering different values for the impact of expenditure on output. The range used 
was based on Baum et al. (2012) and Boussard et al. (2012). 




Figure D-I: Actual and rule-based expenditure in percentage of GDP for EU-10 countries 
  




Figure D-II: Actual and rule-based expenditure in billions of national currency for EU-15 countries 
  




Figure D-III: Actual and rule-based expenditure in billions of national currency for EU-10 countries 
  




Figure D-IV: Actual and rule-based debt in billions of national currency for EU-15 countries 
  




Figure D-V: Actual and rule-based debt in billions of national currency for EU-10 countries 
  




Figure D-VI: Actual expenditure and rule-based expenditure in percentage of GDP for EU-15 countries 
  




Figure D-VII: Actual expenditure and rule-based expenditure for EU-10 countries 
  




Figure D-VIII: Actual output and rule-based output by expenditure multiplier for EU-15 countries 
  




Figure D-IX: Actual output and rule-based output by expenditure multiplier for EU-10 countries 
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Table D-II  
Actual debt and expenditure values, rule-based debt and expenditure in absolute values 








Simulation example for Portugal 
 
 
